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STUDENT CASE COMMENTARY

CRAWFORD MEANS WHAT IT SAYS:
THE BIRTH OF THE MELENDEZ-DIAZ
OBJECTION
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
Danielle Greer]
I.

Summary

In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, with Justice
Scalia writing the opinion, the Supreme Court considered
the issue of whether affidavits reporting the results of
forensic analysis connecting the defendant to an illegal
substance are testimonial and therefore subject to the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Court
held in Pointer v. Texas that the Confrontation Clause
applies to all criminal prosecutions. 3 The statute derives its4
authority from the Fourteenth and the Sixth Amendments.
This Clause ensures defendants the right to confront
adverse witnesses. 5 The Court's holding in Crawford v.
Washington established the rule that testimonial statements
are subject to the Confrontation Clause. 6 Therefore, the
defendant has the right to confront any witness "who
1 J.D., pending 2011, Univ. of Tennessee; B.A., Sociology with
Criminal Justice concentration. Prior to attending law school, Ms.
Greer worked as a case manager for developmentally delayed children.
2 U.S. CONST., amend. XI.
3 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (holding that a defendant
should enjoy the right to confront all the witnesses against him).
4 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2529 (2009); see
also Pointer,380 U.S. at 404. See generally U.S. CONST., amend. VI.
5 See generally U.S. CONST., amend. VI.
6

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-63 (2004).
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'bear[s] testimony' against him.",7 If the witness is
unavailable for trial and the defendant has not had an
that witness, the testimony is
opportunity to cross-examine
8
deemed inadmissible.
In Crawford, the Court explicitly stated that "ex
parte in-court testimony" that "would lead an objective
witness to reasonably believe that the statement would be"9
used later at trial is considered a testimonial statement.
The Court listed certain statements that it considered
testimonial, including affidavits, but explained that these
statements can come in various forms. 0 However, the
testimonial issue became unclear when the Massachusetts
Court of Appeals in Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz,
bound by precedent of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, held that authors of certificates of forensic
analysis are not subject to confrontation under the Sixth
The Supreme Judicial Court of
Amendment."1
Massachusetts denied review, and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 12 In a five-to-four
plurality decision, the Court reversed and remanded
Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, and held that certificates
containing forensic analysis are testimonial and the
admission of such evidence without the ability to crossexamine the author violates the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment. 13

7 Id. at 68-69.
8 Id. at51.
IId. at 51-52.
10

Id.

11Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 69 Mass. App. Ct 1114 (2007).
12 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2529 (2009).
13 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2529 (hereinafter "Melendez-Diaz").
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Background

II.

This case began as a Massachusetts state court drug
trial. Three men were arrested after police received a tip
that an employee at Kmart frequently exhibited suspicious
activity. 15 Following up on this tip, the police monitored
Kmart until they witnessed the reported activity. 16 The
activity suggested that the employee was leaving Kmart to
sell drugs and often returned a short time later.' 7 Working
under this assumption, the police searched the employee
when he returned to Kmart and found drugs in his
possession. 18 Believing the substance was cocaine, the
officers arrested all three men. 19 During transit to jail, the
officers noticed two of the three men were moving and
fidgeting in the backseat of the car.2 ° They ordered the
men to stop. 2 1 After the men were booked at the police
station, the officers found a plastic bag with nineteen
22
smaller bags of cocaine in it inside the police car.
Because he was one of the two men fidgeting in the
backseat of the police car during the transport, the officers
assumed that Melendez-Diaz hid the drugs in the police car
to avoid additional charges. 23 The officers charged the
defendant, Melendez-Diaz, with distributing and trafficking
cocaine. 24
During trial, the prosecution sought to admit three
certificates of forensic analysis that identified the substance
14

14
15

Id. at 2530.
id.

16

id.

17

id.

18 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530.
19 Id.
20

Id.

21

Id.
id.
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530.
Id. at 2531-32.

22
23
24
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found at the scene as cocaine.25 The defendant objected to
the admission of these certificates absent an opportunity to
26
The trial
cross-examine the author, citing Crawford.
and subsequently the jury
judge overruled this objection,
27
found Melendez-Diaz guilty.
III.

Court's Conclusions and Rationale

The outcome of this case turned on whether the
certificates of forensic analysis were testimonial statements
within the meaning of Crawford. However, the Court also
spent considerable time addressing each of the State's and
the dissent's arguments. Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, explained that in Crawford the Court listed
affidavits in the "core class of testimonial statements." 28
Although the State argued that a certificate is different from
an affidavit, Justice Scalia referred to Black's Law
Dictionary and rejected this argument. 29 In Black's Law
Dictionary, certificates are defined as "declaration[s] of
facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an
officer authorized to administer oaths." 30 Justice Scalia
further explains that under Crawford, these certificates are
a "solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose
of establishing or proving some fact.",3 1 The Court also
relied on its decision in Davis v. Washington, finding that
the certificates would do "exactly what a witness would do

25

Id. at 2532.

26

Id.

27

Id.

28 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
29

Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.

30 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
31

62 (8th ed. 2004).

Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.

4
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on direct examination. ' '32 On those facts, the Court
33
concluded the certificates were testimonial statements.
The State advanced many arguments, some of
34
which Justice Kennedy reiterated in his dissent.
However, each was unpersuasive to the majority of the
Court. Nevertheless, six of the State's arguments deserve
notice. The first was that the certificate was not an
accusatory witness. 35 Citing the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment, Justice Scalia asserted that the
Clause only contemplated two classes of witnesses: a
beneficial witness and an adverse witness. 36 The certificate
certainly was not beneficial; therefore, it was adverse and
subject to the Confrontation Clause.37
The second argument was that neither the
certificates nor their authors were conventional witnesses
for three reasons: the forensic analysts only observed nearcontemporaneous events; they did not observe the crime or
anything related to it, and the certificates were not provided
in response to interrogation. 3 s The State argued that only
conventional witnesses are subject to the Confrontation
Clause and explained that the forensic analysts are not
conventional witnesses. 39 In analyzing the confrontation
issue, the focus is on the substance of the testimony, not the
40
Therefore, the Court rejected the
actual witness.
argument that only witnesses who observe non32

Id. at 2542 ("It is unlikely that defense counsel will insist on live

testimony whose effect will be merely to highlight rather than cast
doubt upon the forensic analysis.")
31 Id. at 2523-26.
34 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543-61 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(accepting some of the State's arguments).
35 129 S. Ct. at 2534.
36 Id. at2535.
37 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2534.
38 Id. at 2534-36.
39 id.
40 id.

5
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contemporaneous events are subject to the Confrontation
Clause. 4 1 Additionally, nothing about the fact that the
certificates were completed almost a week after the tests
were conducted cures the statement of its testimonial
nature.42
The fact that the forensic analyst did not observe the
crime adds nothing to the issue of whether the statement is
testimonial. The proposition that only witnesses who
directly observe the crime are subject to the Confrontation
Clause is without supporting authority and if implemented,
would also exempt expert witnesses.43 The State further
argued that the forensic analysts' certificates were not
testimonial in nature because the certificates were not
provided in response to interrogation. 44 This argument was
also rejected by the Court, primarily because implementing
that rule would exclude another important class of
all witness who voluntarily gave their
witnesses:
statements to police.45 In the interests of creating a
workable rule, the Court had to reject the State's argument
that only conventional witnesses are subject to the
Confrontation Clause.
The State's third argument was that the
46
Confrontation Clause does not apply to scientific testing.
The State argued that because the Clause was designed to
prevent manipulation and distortion prone to recollection
testimony, it did not apply to a purely neutral, scientific
testing.47 However, the Court provided extensive evidence
that scientific data is prone to human error and suggested
that forcing the analyst to testify will deter other analysts
41

id.

42

Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2534-36.

43

Id.

44id.
45 id.
46

Id. at 2536.

47 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536.

6
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from committing fraud or making careless mistakes. 48 The
Court also noted that of all criminal convictions eventually
overturned, sixty percent of the defendants were convicted
with incorrect forensic evidence that was later proven
invalid.49
The State's fourth argument was that at common
law these forensic analysts' certificates were considered
business records and accepted without objection. 50 The
Court insinuated that this argument misses the issue. 51 It is
not the document's status as a business record that is
dispositive, but the qtuestion of whether it was made in
anticipation of trial.:
In the dissent, Justice Kennedy
agreed with the State's argument that analysts' certificates
in general have customarily been accepted without
objection and cites one situation where a clerk certificate,
prepared in anticipation of trial, was admitted without
being subject to the Confrontation Clause. 53 However, the
Court distinguishes the clerk's certificate from that of the
forensic analyst: the clerk's certificate only certifies that a
document is correct.54 The clerk has no authority to add
anything substantive or opine in any way on this
certificate.55 This is in contrast to a forensic analyst's
certificate that is used as prima facie evidence of a
defendant's guilt. 56 The Court did not accept the State's
57 In fact, these
argument that these cases are analogous.
58
cases are easily distinguishable.
48
49
50
51

Id. at 2536-37.
Id. at 2534.
Id. at 2538.
Id. at 2838-41.

Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538-41.
53 Id.
52

54

id.

51 Id. at 2539.
56 id.
57 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2539.
58 id.

7
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The fifth argument asserted by the State was that
the Confrontation Clause should not apply because the
defendant could have subpoenaed the analyst.5 9 The
subpoena power derives from the Compulsory Process
Clause, but the Court retorted that this Clause is no
The latter
substitute for the Confrontation Clause.
imposes on the prosecution to present its witnesses, but
requiring the defendant to present adverse witnesses would
leave him with no remedy if those witnesses refused to
appear or were unavailable. 61 Additionally, this would shift
the State's62 burden to present its witnesses to the
defendant.
The last argument the State asked the Court to
consider was the effect this ruling would have on the
already strained criminal justice system. 63 The State
predicted that defense attorneys, who are zealously
advocating for their clients, would always request that
analysts come to court. 6 4

That, in turn, would increase

costs for the government and place an undue burden on the
analysts. 65 The Court responded to this argument by
analogizing this potential burden with the burden of a jury
trial and the privilege against self-incrimination: although
burdensome, "they are constitutional protections that we
cannot disregard." 66
The Court also discussed notice-and-demand
statutes that require a defendant to give notice of intent to
use the analyst's report. 67 In his dissent, Justice Kennedy
argued that these statutes face invalidation in light of the
59 id.

6 Id. at 2540.
61

id.

62

Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540.

63

Id. at 2540-41.

64 Id.
65 Id.
66 id.
67

Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541-42.

8
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Court's decision because they are burden-shifting
Similar to the State, this argument is still
statutes.
emphasizing the burden that this rule will place on the
criminal justice system. Again, the argument failed to
move a majority of the Court.69 The Court explained that
"the defendant always has the burden" to raise the
Confrontation Clause objection. 70 If the defendant ever
fails to raise this burden, the issue is lost on appeal. 7' The
Court further explained that the simplest form of noticeand-demand statutes only govern the period within which a
defendant must respond, and that is constitutional.72 The
Court noted that it was only opining on the legality of
notice-and-demand statutes similar to the one described.73
Despite the State's many arguments, the Court
maintained that the forensic certificates were testimonial.7"
As such, the trial court should not have admitted the
evidence without the analyst's trial testimony or a
defendant having a previous opportunity to crossexamine. 75 The Court's decisions in Crawford and Davis
dictate that the inability to cross-examine an adverse
witness is a violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights, and the Court adhered to that precedent.
IV.

Analysis

Although the State and Justice Kennedy had
compelling arguments, the Court's decision in MelendezDiaz was directly in line with precedent. In Crawford and
68
69
70

71

Id. at 2957.
Id. at 2541-42
id.

72

id.
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541-42.

73
74
75

id.
Id. at 2532.
id.

9
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Davis, the Court set precedent that the Court has an interest
in following, absent overwhelming policy concerns. These
cases posed the most daunting obstacles to the State's
arguments because if the holdings applied, there was no
question of whether the certificates were testimonial and
subject to the Confrontation Clause. Realizing this, the
State tried to distinguish Crawford and Davis from
Melendez-Diaz, but offered only one distinguishable fact:
that the questionable testimony in Melendez-Diaz was a
certificate, as opposed to the verbal testimony at issue in
Crawford and Davis.76 The Court rightfully rejected this
argument, explaining that the Confrontation Clause only
beneficial and
anticipates two classes of witnesses:
adverse. 77 The certificates were clearly adverse to the
defendant because this was the only evidence the
prosecution had that proved the substance in question was
cocaine.78
Additionally, the factual distinction that the State
and Justice Kennedy asserted is not supported by case law.
In Crawford, the Court explicitly stated that "various
. affidavits" are in the "core class of
testimonial statements." 79 However, the State argued that
formulations of

. .

the forensic analyst's certificate was not an affidavit and
80
should not be subject to the confrontation requirement.
The problem with this argument is twofold. First, the Court
in Crawford explained that affidavits come in various
forms. 8 1 Calling the document a certificate does not
dispose of the issue. Second, the State neglected to address
the fact that it is the content that determines whether the

76

Id. at 2534.

77 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2534.
78 Id. at 2531.
79 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.

80 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
8 Id. at 2531-21.

10
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certificate is testimonial. 82 Deferring to Crawford, the
Court held that the certificates were the functional
equivalent of affidavits because they were adverse to the
83
defendant and were made in anticipation of litigation.
Because of the well-established precedent, the Court had
little choice other than to render this class of evidence
subject to the Confrontation Clause. To rule otherwise
would question the status of those decisions and further
complicate the law in this area.
Nevertheless, the State brought up two persuasive
issues that the Court will likely see again: notice-anddemand statutes and emergence of "the Melendez-Diaz
objection., 84 The Court implied that very basic notice-anddemand statutes are constitutional, although this is likely
dicta.85 However, the Court explicitly stated that this
opinion only extended to the simplest type of notice-anddemand statutes, refusing to express an opinion on the
actual "burden-shifting" statutes.
This suggests that the
Court would find that statutes imposing more than simple,
procedural requirements are unconstitutional. If the precise
issue on notice-and-demand statutes ever comes before the
Supreme Court, the Melendez-Diaz decision will
undoubtedly inform the Court's decision.
Justice Kennedy warned that the Court's holding
was too expansive and unnecessarily gave defendants an
unwarranted windfall.87 He predicted that once defense
attorneys were aware of Melendez-Diaz's implications,
upon objection, forensic analysts would have to testify

82

Id.

83 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
84

Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541.

85 Id. at 2541 ("[W]hat we have referred to as the 'simplest form of

notice and demand statutes,'.., is constitutional").
86 id.
87

Id. at 2557.
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88
because the attorneys would relentlessly use it as a tactic.
This would become known as the Melendez-Diaz
objection. 89 This point is valid, and the situation is likely to
Although the majority dismissed this
come about.
argument, it is highly likely that at least the great defense
attorneys will take advantage of this requirement, forcing
the prosecution to produce its witnesses. However, it is an
overarching public concern that mandates this risk: the
constitutional right of a defendant to have a fair trial.
Requiring all forensic analysts to come to court would
undoubtedly place a strain on the system, but that concern
is markedly insufficient to warrant divesting a defendant of
his constitutional rights.

V.

Conclusion

The Court's ruling in Melendez-Diaz made it clear
that in criminal trials the admission of forensic analysts'
certificates into evidence is subject to the Confrontation
Clause. Pre-Melendez-Diaz, the analysts' certificates had
generally been admitted into evidence with little or no
objection in states across the United States. Because the
Court determined that forensic analysts' certificates are
subject to Confrontation Clause scrutiny, the analysts will
now be required to give direct testimony. If the Court
follows the dicta in Melendez-Diaz regarding notice-anddemand statutes when deciding future cases, it is very
possible that notice-and-demand statutes that go beyond
will be found
requirements
simple, procedural
unconstitutional. In balancing the constitutional rights of
the criminal defendant with the need of efficiency in the
judicial system, the Court must err on the side of the
defendant who risks the loss of life and liberty.
88 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2557.
89

Id. at 2556-57.
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